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Towards a uni ed theory of cooperative breeding:
the role of ecology and life history re-examined
Ido Pen1,2* and Franz J. Weissing1,3
1Department of Genetics, and 2Zoological Laboratory, University of Groningen, POBox 14, 9750 AA Haren,The Netherlands
3Department of Zoology, University Zu« rich-Irchel,Winterthurstrasse 190, 8057 Zu« rich, Switzerland
We present quantitative models that unify several adaptive hypotheses for the evolution of cooperative
breeding in a single framework: the ecological constraints hypothesis, the life-history hypothesis and the
bene¢ts-of-philopatry hypothesis. Our goal is to explain interspeci¢c variation in the occurrence of
cooperative breeding in terms of interspeci¢c variation in life-history traits and ecological conditions. We
analyse two models, according to whether or not helpers can inherit their parents’ territory. Major results
are (i) territory inheritance always promotes cooperative breeding; (ii) if territories are not inherited,
neither ecological constraints nor variation in life-history traits predict interspeci¢c variation in
cooperative breeding; and (iii) if territories are inherited, the mechanism of density regulation is crucial
in determining which factors promote cooperative breeding. If density dependence acts on the probability
to obtain a free territory or on the survival of dispersers, variation in ecological constraints cannot
explain variation in cooperative breeding. Lower adult mortality favours helping, not because it reduces
the availability of free territories, but because it enhances the direct bene¢ts of helpers. If density
dependence acts on fecundity, lower probability of obtaining a free territory and lower survival of
dispersers promote cooperative breeding. In this case, lower adult mortality works against the evolution
of helping. We suggest that the di¡erence between birds and social insects in the covariance between
cooperative breeding and life-history traits is due to di¡erent mechanisms of density regulation that
operate in these taxa, and we explain how natural selection on habitat choice might have caused these
di¡erent mechanisms to operate.
Keywords: helping; relatedness; Hamilton’s rule; ¢tness; reproductive value ; density dependence
1. INTRODUCTION
In cooperatively breeding species, some individuals forgo
their own reproduction, at least temporarily, and help
raise the o¡spring of others, usually their close relatives.
What are the factors that predispose a species to evolve
such behaviour ? More speci¢cally we ask: In a compara-
tive analysis, what properties of cooperatively breeding
species or their environment would set them apart from
non-cooperatively breeding species, argued from a selec-
tionist perspective ? In this paper we focus on the
conditions that favour cooperative breeding in birds, or at
least organisms with a life history similar to that of many
birds, because of the wealth of comparative studies on
birds (reviews in, for example, Faaborg & Patterson 1981;
Koenig & Pitelka 1981; Emlen 1984; Brown 1987; Koenig
et al. 1992; Arnold & Owens 1998, 1999; Hatchwell &
Komdeur 2000). We will discuss the relevance of our
results for social insects, which usually have quite
di¡erent life histories and genetics (Crozier & Pamilo
1996).
Several hypotheses, not mutually exclusive, have been
proposed to explain the evolution of cooperative breeding.
The most in£uential hypotheses can be classi¢ed
according to the following scheme.
(i) Ecological constraints (EC) hypothesis (Brown 1974;
Emlen 1982, 1997; Koenig et al. 1992).
(ii) Life-history (LH) hypothesis (Russell 1989;
Cockburn 1996; Arnold & Owens 1998).
(iii) Bene¢ts-of-philopatry (BP) hypothesis (Stacey &
Ligon 1987, 1991).
According to the EC hypothesis, the opportunities for
independent breeding are limited or risky because of
ecological factors such as low availability of nesting sites,
low availability of other resources, or a high risk of
mortality during dispersal. The LH hypothesis empha-
sizes that certain life-history characteristics of a species
limit the opportunities for independent breeding. For
example, low adult mortality might lead to slow territory
turnover, leading to prolonged periods of £oating or
queuing and a smaller probability to obtain a territory
(e.g. Ens et al. 1995; Kokko & Sutherland 1998; Pen &
Weissing 2000a). Thus, the EC and LH hypotheses both
stress that the direct ¢tness bene¢ts of seeking indepen-
dent breeding opportunities are too small to outweigh the
indirect inclusive ¢tness bene¢ts of helping relatives. In
terms of Hamilton’s rule rb ¡ c40 (Hamilton 1964), EC
and LH hypotheses suppose that the direct costs c of
helping are small relative to the indirect bene¢t b,
because individuals have little to lose by not dispersing.
In contrast, the BP hypothesis emphasizes the long-term
direct bene¢ts of staying near the natal nest: short-term
losses incurred by not dispersing are compensated by
greater long-term direct bene¢ts, in the form of inheri-
tance of the natal territory.
We study these hypotheses by unifying them into a
quantitative model. The main objective is to make predic-
tions that can be tested with comparative studies. Our
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models might be useful for three reasons: ¢rst, most of
the above hypotheses have not been modelled quantita-
tively, and it is well known that verbal arguments can be
quite misleading when the complexities of life histories
have to be taken into account. Our models serve to test
the logic of such verbal arguments, and to better under-
stand what assumptions are required to make the
arguments work. Second, existing models are mostly based
on applying Hamilton’s rule without using proper ¢tness
measures. It is not so obvious what the bene¢t b and the
cost c in Hamilton’s rule represent in a life-history context,
and most authors rely on ad hoc interpretations. In
contrast, we use a reproductive value approach where
¢tness is derived from explicit population dynamic consid-
erations. Third, existing models do not take into account
population dynamic constraints that limit population
growth. We explicitly incorporate several mechanisms of
density regulation and show that these can have important
consequences for the evolution of cooperative breeding.
2. LIFE HISTORY AND ECOLOGY
(a) Strategy
We consider a species where individuals have the
choice to stay at the natal nest and become a helper, or to
disperse and find a new nest elsewhere. The species is
either asexual, or dioecious with males having complete
dispersal and females deciding whether to stay or not.
Females have a genetically determined strategy x 2 ‰0,1Š,
which represents their tendency to become a helper. The
population as a whole, the resident population, is mono-
morphic for helping tendency x*. We concentrate on a
mutant female with helping tendency x 6ˆ x*. As an adult,
the female may get help from her previously produced
o¡spring, the probability of which is determined by the
average helping tendency x of the female’s o¡spring. The
o¡springs’ helping tendency x may di¡er from that of the
population as a whole because of the relatedness between
mother and o¡spring.
In ½ 3(a), we ask under what conditions a mutant
female with helping tendency x40 has a selective advan-
tage in a resident population without any helpers, that is,
with helping tendency x* ˆ 0. We assume that mutations
are of small e¡ect, such that x40 is small.
(b) Demography
Territory owners or `breeders’ survive from one season to
the next withprobability Sb and helpers survive with prob-
ability Sh. The survival probabilities are assumed to be
independent of the number of helpers. This assumption
simpli¢es the analysis, but does not a¡ect our main conclu-
sions. Breeders produce F o¡spring per season. F depends
on a breeder’s expected number of helpers n ˆ n(x), which
is an increasing function of the average helping tendency x
of a breeder’s o¡spring. For a small number of helpers,
reproductive output can be approximated by
F(x) ˆ F0 ‡ hn(x), (1)
where F0 is reproductive output without helpers and h is the
expected number of extra o¡springproducedper helper.
Individuals that opt for dispersal pay a survival cost k;
that is, relative to helpers they survive with probability
1 ¡ k from their season of birth to the next. Dispersers
become `waiters’, £oating or queuing individuals without
a territory, waiting for suitable territories to become avail-
able in the future. Waiters survive from one season to the
next with probability Sw. Provided they survive, waiters
have a per-capita probability ¬ of obtaining a territory in
a given season. The variables k, Sw and ¬ may be
regarded as representing the `ecological constraints’ on
independent breeding. The higher k and the lower Sw or
¬, the more severe are these constraints.
(c) Helping, and then what?
Helpers remain helpers as long as their mother is still
alive. We consider two scenarios of what happens to
helpers when they ¢nish their helping c`areer’.
(i) No territory inheritance
When helpers stop helping, they disperse from the
natal area and wait for territories to become available.
Dispersal is just as costly (survival cost k) for helpers as it
is for individuals that opt for dispersal in their season of
birth. Our main conclusions are robust with respect to
small departures from this assumption (i.e. small survival
bene¢ts of philopatry). Thus, helpers do not gain any
direct bene¢ts from helping, but only indirect bene¢ts by
raising related o¡spring.
The life cycle for this scenario is depicted in ¢gure 1.
The ¢gure shows three classes of individuals: helpers (H),
waiters (W) and breeders (B). Arrows indicate transitions
between classes and the symbols the per-capita contri-
bution per season of one class to another. Equivalently,
the transitions between the three classes can be repre-
sented by a transition matrix (Caswell 1989), given by
A ˆ
ShSb 0 xSbF(x)




The matrix represents the population dynamics of
females with strategy x having o¡spring with strategy x in
a resident population with strategy x*. In ½ 3(b) we
explain how the matrix is used to derive the ¢tness conse-
quences of having strategy x. First we explain the entries
of the matrix.
Individuals are counted just before the onset of the
breeding season. Mortality of helpers and breeders occurs
between breeding seasons. The ¢rst column of the matrix
represents the per-capita contribution of the class of
helpers to the three classes of individuals. The ¢rst entry
is the probability that a helper is still a helper one season
later, which happens if and only if both helper and
breeder survive until then, with probability ShSb. The
second entry is the probability that a helper is no longer a
helper next season, but has dispersed and is waiting for a
territory. This happens if the breeder dies (probability
1 ¡ Sb) and the helper survives (probability (1 ¡ k)Sh).
The third entry is zero because helpers cannot obtain a
territory without waiting at least one season for it ¢rst,
just like o¡spring that skip the helping altogether.
The second column represents the per-capita contri-
bution of waiters. The ¢rst entry is zero because waiters
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do not become helpers. The second entry is the
probability that a waiter is still a waiter next season,
which happens if she survives (probability Sw) and does
not ¢nd a vacant territory (probability 1¡ ¬). The third
entry is the probability a waiter will be a breeder next
season, which happens if she survives (probability Sw)
and ¢nds a vacant territory (probability ¬).
The third column combines the per-capita contribution
of breeders to the next season’s population. The ¢rst entry
is a breeder’s o¡spring that become helpers next year. A
breeder’s F(x) o¡spring becomes a helper with prob-
ability xSb ; that is, an o¡spring becomes a helper with
probability x if its mother survives, with probability Sb.
The second entry represents the o¡spring that are
waiting for a territory next season. An individual
o¡spring does not become a helper with probability
1 ¡ xSb and survives the dispersal phase with probability
1 ¡ k. The ¢nal entry is the probability that a breeder is
still a breeder next season because she survived. The
referees of this paper remarked that it might be confusing
that the helping probability x, the strategic decision of
newborn individuals, appears in the third column, corre-
sponding to the per-capita contribution of breeders. This
issue is clari¢ed in Appendix A.
(ii) Territory inheritance
In the second scenario for the fate of helpers, they may
inherit the territory, which can be considered a direct
bene¢t of philopatry. If x is su¤ciently small, parents
have at most one helper. This helper will then inherit the
territory with certainty, provided she survives. The life
cycle is depicted in ¢gure 2 and the corresponding transi-
tion matrix is given by
A ˆ
ShSb 0 xSbF(x)
0 (1 ¡ ¬)Sw (1 ¡ k)(1 ¡ xSb)F(x)




No population can grow or shrink forever ; hence we
assume that density dependence acts to keep the resident
population stationary in size. Mathematically, this means
that the dominant eigenvalue l* of the transition matrix
with x and x replaced by x* equals unity. The constraint
l* ˆ 1 implies that the model loses one degree of freedom;
that is, one of the model parameters must be removed by
expressing it in terms of the remaining model parameters.
Choosing which parameter is to be removed from the
model re£ects an assumption about the speci¢c
mechanism of density dependence (Mylius & Diekmann
1995). As we shall see, this choice may have profound
consequences for the model predictions.
3. SELECTION
(a) The direction of selection
We want to know under what conditions helping beha-
viour has a selective advantage in a population without
helpers. In other words, we ask whether a resident popu-
lation monomorphic for helping tendency x* ˆ 0 can be
invaded by a rare mutant with helping tendency x40. To
answer this question, we analyse the ¢tness of such a
mutant, written as W(x, x, x*). This notation expresses
the notion that the ¢tness of a mutant need depend not
only on its own helping tendency x and the population
helping tendency x*, but also on the average helping
tendency x of individuals that interact locally with the
mutant.
We use the direct ¢tness approach, developed byTaylor
& Frank (1996; see also Frank 1998) to investigate the
e¡ect of selection on helping behaviour. A small change








evaluated at x ˆ x ˆ x*. The ¢rst term on the right is the
e¡ect of a small change in the actor’s helping propensity x
on her ¢tness, and the second term is the e¡ect on the
actor’s ¢tness caused by a correlated change in the amount
of help the actor gets herself, as determined by the local
helping tendency x. The strength of the correlation is
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(1 – a )Sw
a Sw
(1 – k)Sh (1 – Sb)
ShSb






Figure 1. Life cycle when helpers (H) do not inherit the
territory of their parents (B) but join the waiters (W) after
they stop helping.










Figure 2. Life cycle when helpers (H) inherit the territory of
their parents (B) after the parents die. Helpers do not compete
with waiters (W).
measured by the relatedness coe¤cient r between helpers
and their bene¢ciaries. A positive sign of ¢W implies
selection in favour of higher x, and a negative sign selec-
tion against higher x.
(b) Fitness
In a class- structured population, condition (4) can be












where aij ˆ aij(x, x, x*) is an element of a transition
matrix (the contribution by a class j individual with
strategy x to class i individuals in the next season), the u*j
are relative frequencies of classes j in demographic equili-
brium, and the v*i are the reproductive values of class i
individuals in the resident population (see, for example,
Taylor 1996; Pen & Weissing 2000c). The class frequencies
and reproductive values are normalized such that
i u
*
i v*i ˆ 1. If, as in our model, the behaviour of interest
is expressed in only class of individuals, say class j ˆ k,
then all terms j 6ˆ k vanish. The positive constant u*k does
not a¡ect the direction of selection and can be ignored.
In other words, we can take as a ¢tness function





This can be interpreted as the total amount of repro-
ductive value produced by a class k individual that
exhibits the mutant behaviour x during one time-step,
and then switches back to the resident behaviour x*.
In our model, the ¢tness of a mutant female with
helping tendency x is given by
W(x, x, x*) ˆ xSbF(x)v*h ‡ (1 ¡ k)(1 ¡ xSb)F(x)v*w ‡ Sbv*b,
(7)
where v*h, v*w and v*b are the reproductive values of,
respectively, helpers, waiters and breeders in the resident
population.
(c) Reproductive values
Technically, the reproductive values v*j are the elements
of a dominant left eigenvector (e.g. Lancaster 1969) of the
matrix A* that results from matrices (2) or (3) by repla-
cing x and x by the resident trait x*. In other words, the




Because only the relative reproductive values matter
(technically, the direction of the vector is important, not
its magnitude), we arbitrarily set one of them to a speci¢c
value. Here we set the reproductive value of waiters equal
to their expected life-time reproductive success (LRS) of
unity, that is,
v*w ˆ 1. (9)
For both matrices (2) and (3) we obtain the same repro-






This is just a breeder’s life expectancy 1/…1 ¡ Sb† multi-
plied by her yearly number of surviving o¡spring,
(1 ¡ k)F0, which is her lifetime reproductive success.
The reproductive value of a helper depends on whether
or not the helper obtains direct bene¢ts by inheriting a
territory. If a helper does not obtain direct bene¢ts, we
calculate v*h from matrix (2), and we get
v*h ˆ
(1 ¡ k)Sh(1 ¡ Sb)
1 ¡ ShSb
. (11)
This again has a clear-cut interpretation: 1/(1 ¡ ShSb) is
the expected number of seasons that a helper helps her
parents, and (1 ¡ k)Sh(1 ¡ Sb) is the probability that a
helper switches to the waiting class. Hence, equation (11)
represents the probability that a helper ever becomes a
waiter (multiplied by the LRS of unity of a waiter).
If a helper inherits her parents’ territory, we calculate




£ (1 ¡ k)F0
1 ¡ Sb
, (12a)
ˆ Sh(1 ¡ k)F0
1 ¡ ShSb
. (12b)
This is just the probability that a helper will ever inherit
the territory times the LRS of a territory owner.
Because we set v*w ˆ 1, equation (8) represents three
equations in two unknowns (v*h and v*b). We have solved
for v*h and v*b, hence that leaves one equation. This
equation is the same for both matrices, and it represents a
`compatibility requirement’ which is equivalent to our
assumption that the resident population is stationary
(l* ˆ 1):
¬Sw
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¬)Sw
ˆ 1 ¡ Sb
(1 ¡ k)F0
. (13)
The left-hand side is the probability that a waiter ever
obtains a territory. The right-hand side is the inverse of
the LRS of a breeder, so we see that the LRS of unity of a
waiter is its probability of ever obtaining a territory
multiplied by the LRS of a breeder. With the help of
equation (13), we will judge later how comparative predic-
tions are a¡ected by the mechanism of density depen-
dence. Suppose, for example, that density dependence
acts via the availability of breeding sites. In this case, the
chance of obtaining a territory, ¬, will decrease with an
increasing density of competitors for breeding sites. When
a stationary population has been reached through these
density-dependent e¡ects, equation (13) has to be satis-
¢ed; that is, ¬ has to satisfy the relationship
¬ ˆ (1
¡ Sw)(1 ¡ Sb)
Sw‰(1 ¡ k)F0 ¡ (1 ¡ Sb)Š
. (14)
Likewise, if density dependence acts on reproductive
output (fecundity and/or juvenile survival), then F0 has
to satisfy
2414 I. Pen and F. J.Weissing Towards a uni¢ed theory of cooperative breeding
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (2000)
F0 ˆ




The direction of selection on x in a population without
helpers is found by applying equation (4) to equation (7)
and setting x* ˆ 0:
¢W ˆ SbF0‰v*h ¡ (1 ¡ k)v*w Š ‡ rhn 0(0)(1 ¡ k)v*w , (16)
a prime denoting di¡erentiation. Here we have used
F 0(0) ˆ hn 0(0). To evaluate ¢W, we need an expression
for the mean number n of helpers per breeder as a func-
tion of the helping tendency. n can be derived from the
distribution (u*h, u*w , u*b) of helpers, waiters and breeders in
demographic equilibrium. Technically, this distribution
corresponds to a dominant right eigenvector of the matrix
A, but it can easily be derived as follows. In demographic
equilibrium, the number of helpers u*h has to satisfy
u*h ˆ ShSbu*h ‡ xSbF(x)u*b, (17)
i.e. it is given by ShSbu*h, the number of helpers in the
previous season that go on helping, plus xSbFu*b, the
number of newly produced helpers. Because the expected
number of helpers per parent is given by n ˆ u*h=u*b, we
obtain from equation (17)
n(x) ˆ xSbF0
1 ¡ Sb(Sh ‡ hx)
. (18)
Di¡erentiation of this expression yields
n 0(0) ˆ SbF0
1 ¡ ShSb
. (19)
The resemblance of equation (16) to Hamilton’s rule
rb ¡ c40 (Hamilton 1964) becomes apparent if we
rewrite equation (16) in the form (up to the factor SbF0)
¢W ˆ ¡c ‡ rb, (20)
where
c ˆ (1 ¡ k)v*w ¡ v*h, (21a)





The term c is the di¡erence in reproductive value v*w of
a waiter, discounted by the probability 1 ¡ k that it
survives the dispersal phase, and the reproductive value
v*h of a helper. Hence, c represents the direct ¢tness cost of
helping rather than dispersing. The term b also has a
simple interpretation: it is the extra number of surviving
o¡spring (1 ¡ k)h produced per helper per season, multi-
plied by the expected number of seasons a helper helps,
1/(1 ¡ ShSb). Hence, rb represents the indirect ¢tness
bene¢ts of helping.
In contrast to the indirect bene¢ts of helping, which
are the same for both scenarios, the direct costs of
helping obviously depend on the future prospects of a
helper. When helpers do not inherit the territory, the
direct cost of helping is obtained by substituting the
reproductive values v*w ˆ 1 and equation (11):
direct cost without inheritance ˆ (1¡ k)(1¡ Sh)
1 ¡ ShSb
. (22)
This expression is always positive.
For the scenario where a helper inherits the territory,
the direct cost of helping is obtained by using equation
(12b):




This expression can be negative for su¡iciently large F0
and/or Sb.
The direction of selection on helping is determined by
the sum of direct and indirect ¢tness e¡ects. For the
scenario where helpers do not inherit the territory,
helping is favoured by selection if
rh41 ¡ Sh. (24)
For the scenario where helpers inherit the territory,
helping is favoured if
rh41 ¡ Sh(F0 ‡ Sb). (25)
One conclusion is immediately obvious: the right-hand
side of equation (25) is always smaller than the right-
hand side of equation (24). This is because the LRS of a
breeder, F0/(1 ¡ Sb), must be larger than unity in a
stationary population. Moreover, the right-hand side of
equation (25) may be negative, in contrast to the right-
hand side of equation (24). We thus have our ¢rst
comparative prediction.
Comparative prediction 1: The occurrence of coopera-
tive breeding is positively related to territory inheritance
by helpers. When helpers inherit the territory, philopatry
can even evolve if rh is negative, i.e. if the `helpers’ do not
help at all or if they are unrelated to the breeders.
According to the EC hypothesis, the parameters k, Sw
and ¬ are important because they determine the chances
of independent breeding, whereas according to the LH
hypothesis, survival Sb of breeders is important because it
determines territory turnover rate. We see that none of
these parameters appear in condition (24); hence they
should not a¡ect the occurrence of cooperative breeding
when territories are not inherited. In other words, in the
absence of `bene¢ts of philopatry’, the EC and LH
hypotheses do not make di¡erent interspeci¢c predictions.
We therefore predict the following.
Comparative prediction 2: In the absence of territory
inheritance by helpers, neither ecological constraints on
independent breeding nor adult survival a¡ect the occur-
rence of cooperative breeding.
Ecological constraints are not important here because
the reproductive value of a waiter always equals unity,
regardless of the severity of the constraints. This makes
intuitive sense: the smaller the probability that a
disperser ever obtains a territory, the larger must be the
reward for those that eventually do obtain a territory,
because fewer individuals will be the progenitors of the
next generation.
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If there are bene¢ts of philopatry in the form of terri-
tory inheritance, then the predictions depend strongly on
the mechanism of density regulation. We see that the
ecological constraint parameters k, Sw and ¬ do not
appear in condition (25); hence if density dependence acts
on any one of these parameters, the condition remains
unchanged and we can conclude that ecological
constraints do not a¡ect the predictions. In that case
higher adult survival Sb increases the likelihood that
helping evolves, as predicted by the LH hypothesis.
However, the reason is not because of higher territory
turnover, as claimed by the LH hypothesis, but rather
because of the higher direct bene¢ts once a helper has
inherited the territory.We predict the following.
Comparative prediction 3: If helpers inherit territories
and density dependence acts on the cost of dispersal or on
survival of waiters or on the probability to ¢nd an empty
territory, then (i) ecological constraints on independent
breeding do not a¡ect the occurrence of cooperative
breeding; and (ii) adult survival is positively related to
the occurrence of cooperative breeding.
If density dependence acts via reproductive output F0
or the survival probabilities of breeders Sb, then the
ecological constraints parameters k, Sw and ¬ enter, indir-
ectly, again in the criterion (25) for the evolution of
helping. If, for example, density dependence acts via
reproductive output, then F0 has to satisfy equation (15)
in a stationary population. Inserting equation (15) into
condition (25) reveals that now the right-hand side
depends on the ecological constraints parameters. It is
easy to show that the right-hand side of equation (25)
decreases with the ecological constraint parameters k, Sw
and ¬, and, contrary to the LH hypothesis, increases
with adult survival Sb. This gives the fourth prediction.
Comparative prediction 4: If helpers inherit territories
and density dependence acts on reproductive output, then
(i) ecological constraints on independent breeding are
positively related to the occurrence of cooperative
breeding; and (ii) adult survival is negatively related to
the occurrence of cooperative breeding.
5. DISCUSSION
We have constructed and analysed several models to
obtain a better understanding of some of the selective
forces that may explain why in some species there is coop-
erative breeding and in others there is not. We have
summarized our ¢ndings in four comparative predictions,
which predict correlations and syndromes of correlations
between life-history traits or ecological factors and the
occurrence of cooperative breeding.
Obviously we have neglected other factors that might
also be important for the evolution of helping behaviour
(Cockburn 1998). For example, we have assumed that
o¡spring remaining near the natal nest always help
(constant positive h in equation (1)). In reality, o¡spring
may face two decisions: to stay at home or not, and if
staying at home, to help or not.With the methods used in
this paper, it would be relatively straightforward to
analyse selection on h, the amount of help provided per
helper, given trade-o¡s between helping and survival and
between helping and being tolerated by group members.
Other potentially important factors we have neglected:
there may disadvantages associated with territory inheri-
tance if this leads to inbreeding. There may be con£icts
over who reproduces. There may be inherent advantages
to group living. There are plenty of ideas, and it is a
challenge to incorporate these into quantitative models.
(a) Comparative empirical evidence
We stress once more that our analysis has focused on
the species level, i.e. our model parameters represent
average values for a given population. Even if our model
predicts no interspeci¢c correlation between cooperative
breeding and ecological constraints, variation of coopera-
tive breeding within a species might well be associated
with ecological constraints. Thus, the experimental
evidence that individual decisions whether to become a
helper or not depend on territory availability (e.g. Pruett-
Jones & Lewis 1990; Komdeur 1992) does not contradict
our predictions.
Our predictions did not take into account that there
may be correlations between di¡erent life-history traits
and/or ecological factors. For example, according to
condition (24), in the absence of territory inheritance by
helpers, survival Sb of breeders should not a¡ect selection
pressures on helping, but higher survival Sh of helpers
should make helping more likely. It seems quite possible
that Sb and Sh are positively correlated between species, in
which case Sb should also be positively related to the
occurrence of cooperative breeding, contrary to prediction
2. This kind of problem applies to all models attempting to
make comparative predictions. Nevertheless, comparative
analyses can circumvent this problem by carefully control-
ling for correlations between explanatory variables.
Two recent articles by Arnold & Owens (1998, 1999)
present phylogenetic analyses of the factors that correlate
with the presence or absence of cooperative breeding in
birds. They ¢nd that ecological constraints do not corre-
late with the occurrence of cooperative breeding, whereas
adult mortality is negatively correlated with cooperative
breeding. This syndrome of correlations corresponds
precisely to our prediction 3. Arnold & Owens (1998,
1999) suggest that the mechanism by which low adult
mortality might promote cooperative breeding is the slow
territory turnover in such species, limiting the opportu-
nities for independent breeding. Our analysis suggests
that this mechanism is unlikely to be the causal factor.
Rather, the enhanced direct bene¢ts associated with low
adult mortality appear to be a crucial factor selecting for
cooperative breeding.
Prediction 3 makes the speci¢c assumptions of territory
inheritance by helpers and a mechanism of density regu-
lation acting on territory availability. Both assumptions
are supported by the available evidence: territory inheri-
tance is widespread among cooperatively breeding birds
(Emlen 1997) and territory availability is an important
limiting factor in birds (Hanski 1982).
(b) Comparison with other models
There are very few quantitative models for the evolu-
tion of cooperative breeding. Most models are of the
verbal kind (e.g. Emlen 1982, 1997; Stacey & Ligon 1987,
1991). The quantitative models that come closest to our
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models are the models of reproductive skew (e.g. Reeve &
Ratnieks 1993). These models attempt to explain the divi-
sion of reproduction within cooperatively breeding
groups. As a special case, they consider under what
conditions individuals become helpers without getting a
share of group reproduction, just as we assume here.
However, apart from a notable exception, these skew
models assume non-overlapping generations and are
therefore not applicable to birds. The exception is a recent
model by Kokko & Johnstone (1999) who correctly point
out that earlier models ignore one of the main reasons
why subordinates (helpers) might remain in the group :
future prospects. Their model assumes that a single helper
takes over the territory after the territory owner has died,
just as in the scenario of territory inheritance considered
here. Kokko & Johnstone’s (1999) model predicts that
high survival of adults may facilitate selection for helping.
However, according to their model, if survival of breeders
is higher than that of helpers, the opposite is also possible.
In contrast, according to our condition (25) higher
survival of breeders should either always facilitate helping
or always select against helping regardless of the relative
survival probabilities of helpers and breeders, but
depending on the mechanism of density regulation. In
essence, their result is based on the fact that the prob-
ability of ever inheriting the territory (the ¢rst factor in
the right-hand side of equation (12a)) may decrease with
the survival Sb of breeders. However, our analysis shows
that the smaller chance of taking over is compensated by
the higher lifetime reproductive success once a helper has
taken over (the second factor in equation (12a)). The dis-
crepancy arises because of two important di¡erences
between our models. First, their model quanti¢es ¢tness
in a more ad hoc manner, instead of using reproductive
values that are derived from population dynamic consid-
erations. Second, in our model the probability that a
breeder gets a helper depends on the strategic helping
tendency of the breeder herself (because her strategy is
correlated with the strategies in her local environment,
due to non-zero relatedness) and of the helping tendency
of others. In Kokko & Johnstone’s (1999) model the prob-
ability that a breeder gets a helper is a constant,
decoupled from the strategies of individuals. At ¢rst sight
this might seem to make our model more complicated,
but the results are actually simpler. This is typical in
these kinds of models (Pen & Weissing 2000b).
The skew models and the verbal models all predict that
ecological constraints on independent breeding opportu-
nities should have a strong positive e¡ect on the occur-
rence of cooperative breeding. In contrast, our analysis
suggests that ecological constraints should correlate with
cooperative breeding only under the speci¢c assumptions
of prediction 4: helpers inherit the territory and density
dependence acts via reduced fecundity or reduced juvenile
survival. The di¡erence is due to our explicit assumption
of a stationary population. Earlier models kept all para-
meters constant, thereby implicitly presupposing an expo-
nentially growing or declining population. In reality, one
or several of the model parameters will be functions of
population density, a fact that can have important evolu-
tionary implications (Mylius & Diekmann 1995). This is
illustrated by our model where di¡erent scenarios of
density dependence lead to quite opposite predictions (3
and 4). Hence, by neglecting density regulation, one would
arrive at the wrong conclusion that helping behaviour
should always be associated with ecological constraints.
(c) Birds versus social insects
We have been taxonomically biased in applying our
models primarily to birds. Models for the evolution of
eusociality in insects (Queller 1989; Gadagkar 1990, 1991)
have led to the conclusion that a high risk of dispersal or
delayed maturity of solitary foundresses are an important
prerequisite for selection to favour-helping behaviour.
Indeed, comparative studies support this conclusion
(Gadagkar 1991). Should not our comparative predictions
also apply to (social) insects ? Not necessarily. Insects
often have life histories that di¡er in a number of crucial
aspects from the life histories of birds. In particular, the
bivoltine life history of many social insects may have
generated unique selection pressures that have been
important for the evolution of eusociality (Stubble¢eld &
Charnov 1986; Crozier & Pamilo 1996). More impor-
tantly, the di¡erences in life histories of birds and insects
will certainly be re£ected in the mechanism of density
regulation. According to predictions 3 and 4, whether or
not ecological constraints should promote cooperative
breeding depends crucially on the mechanism of density
regulation. The di¡erences between birds and insects in
the correlation between ecological constraints and coop-
erative breeding could therefore be explained if it were
true that in birds territory availability is a limiting factor,
whereas in insects fecundity or juvenile survival limits
population growth. The evidence seems to support this
(Hanski 1982). Moreover, there are good theoretical
reasons to suppose that natural selection might cause
density dependence to act on territory availability more
readily in birds than in insects. Elsewhere, we have shown
that selection on habitat choice causes higher adult
survival to favour a higher minimal acceptable territory
quality (Pen & Weissing 2000a). Because mortality rates
in insects are generally much higher than in birds, high
quality territories are more likely to be a limiting resource
in birds than in insects.
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APPENDIX A
Here we justify the use of the transition matrix (2).
It is helpful to think of a season or year as being
composed of two consecutive parts. The ¢rst part starts
before the breeding season. At this point there are three
classes of individuals in the population: helpers, waiters
and breeders (see ¢gure 1). We store their numbers in the
column vector n ˆ (nh, nw , nb). During the ¢rst part of
the season, reproduction and mortality take place.
During reproduction, each female produces F(x)
surviving o¡spring, x being the average helping tendency
of the female’s previous o¡spring. Reproduction yields an
extra class of indivuals, the juveniles, of which there are
nj, say. After mortality there are nh helpers, nw waiters
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and nb breeders left. Thus, at the end of the ¢rst part of
the season there are four classes of individuals, and we
keep track of them in the column vector







In the second part of the season, individuals can switch
between classes. Waiters can become breeders or not,
helpers can stay helpers or become waiters, and a juvenile
(the a`ctor’ class in the terminology of Taylor & Frank
(1996)) becomes a helper or a waiter, determined by its
individual helping tendency x. After the switching
between classes we are at the beginning of the next
season, and there are again three classes of individuals,
counted in the vector n0 ˆ (n0h, n0w , n0b) ˆ Cn, where
C ˆ
Sb 0 0 xSb
(1¡ k)(1¡Sb) 1¡ ¬ 0 (1¡ k)(1¡ xSb)
0 ¬ 1 0
. (A2)
Combining the two parts of the season, the change in the
number of helpers, waiters and breeders from one season
to the next is determined by the product CB of the above
matrices, which is the matrix A in equation (2) in ½ 2(c)(i).
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